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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
I. SEARCH AND SEIM
A question of novel impression was presented to the South
Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Curley.1 Does the search of
an automobile with the consent of the person to whom its custody
and control have been surrendered by the owner violate the
owner's fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures?
Curley lent his automobile to a woman, who, while driving the
car, was stopped by a deputy sheriff for a traffic violation.
The deputy asked for permission to search the trunk of the car,
and the driver consented. While searching the trunk, the deputy
discovered a pair of tennis shoes with distinctive characteristics
which appeared to match footprints (of which plaster casts had
been made) found at the scene of a break-in that was under
investigation. On the basis of this lead the defendant Curley
was arrested and charged with the break-in and robbery. An
F.B.I. examination later proved that the tennis shoes matched
the footprints at the scene of the crime, and the defendant
Curley was convicted.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, relying on Frazier v.
Cupp,2 held that the driver's consent was binding as to Curley
and that he had no right to assert that there had been an
unreasonable search. In the words of the Frazier case, Curley
assumed the risk that the driver would allow the police to
search the car; and, the driver having given such consent, the
owner cannot later complain.
In United States v. Melvin8 the court of appeals reversed the
conviction of the defendant for knowingly taking and receiving
obscene materials from a common carrier which had traveled
interstate. The conviction had been based solely on evidence
which had been seized pursuant to a search warrant which had
itself been issued only through a showing of probable cause by
affidavit. Thus, the search warrant had to stand or fail on the
basis of the affidavit and on that alone.
4
1. 253 S.C. 513, 171 S.E2d 699 (1970).
2. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
3. 419 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1969).
4. United States v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507, 509 (7th Cir. 1967).
1
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The affidavit was held insufficient in that it was based on
tips from informers of unknown reliability and there were not
sufficient details indicating any criminal activity.5 The court
in accord with Aguilar v. Tewas6 and Spinelli v. United States7
held that the affidavit must give the magistrate concrete reasons
to support the alleged reliability of the informer and must
describe the defendant's criminal activities in sufficient detail
so that the magistrate will be relying on something more sub-
stantial than an underworld rumor.
In Vale v. Louisiana" the defendant was lawfully arrested on
the front steps of his home for a narcotics violation. The ar-
resting officers then conducted a warrantless search of his entire
house, in which a quantity of narcotics was found. The Supreme
Court held the search invalid because it was not confined to the
area in the immediate vicinity of the arrest and because there
were no other extenuating circumstances that could justify the
extended search.9 The Court reasserted the (Ihimel" doctrine:
warrantless searches pursuant to a lawful arrest must be confined
to the area in which the accused might gain possession of a
weapon or destroy evidence, unless there are exceptional cir-
cumstances which make an extensive search necessary. The
Court noted that the state has the burden of proving such
exceptional circumstances and that the state had not done so in
the case at bar.
In Chambers v. Maroney" the defendant was arrested in his
automobile by police who did not have an arrest warrant, but
who did have ample probable cause for the arrest. The car was
driven to the police station where it was thoroughly searched
without a warrant and where highly incriminating evidence was
discovered. The Court held this search to be lawful, because the
police had probable cause to search at the time the car was
stopped and this probable cause applied also at the police sta-
tion. The members of the Court based their decision primarily
5. The only alleging of any criminal activity was that an employee at
the bus station had seen a film entitled "Hungry" in the defendant's suitcase;
the court correctly noted that the title could indicate a film about any number
of subjects.
6. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
7. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
8. 90 S. Ct 1969 (1970).
9. The officers by their own admission had determined that there was no
one else in the house, so there was no possibility that any evidence in the
house would be destroyed.
10. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
11. 90 S. Ct. 1975 (1970).
1970]
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on the fact that the increased mobility offered persons by cars
had created the legitimate need to search cars without first
obtaining a warrant. The Court further stated that, where
there is probable cause to search, an auto may be detained until
a search warrant can be obtained, or an immediate search with-
out a warrant may be conducted; and either course will be
permissible under the fourth amendment.
In United States v. Van Leeuwen,12 the defendant contended
that the evidence upon which his conviction was based was
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. The defendant,
driving a car with Canadian license plates, stopped at a United
States Post Office near the Canadian border to mail two pack-
ages. The defendant insured both packages for $10,000.00 and
declared that they contained coins. The postal clerk became
suspicious and alerted a policeman who happened to be in the
post office.
After noting the size and the weight of the packages, their
false return addresses, and the license plates of the defendant's
car, the policeman notified customs. Since one addressee was
under investigation for trafficking in illegal coins, the two
packages were held for 29 hours'8 until a search warrant could
be obtained.
The Court upheld the detention of the first class mail' 4 and
the subsequent search as reasonable, since, first, the private
nature of this mail was not disturbed until a search warrant had
been obtained and, second, the suspicious circumstances war-
ranted detention until a search warrant could be obtained. The
Court, taking all the facts into consideration, held that the
detention and the searches were reasonable within the meaning
and context of the fourth amendment.
II. LEnEup
In State v. Harvey'5 the defendant contended that his pre-
trial lineup identification by the prosecuting witness, conducted
in the absence of counsel, deprived him of his rights under the
sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. The South
Carolina Supreme Court, in denying relief, noted that the lineup
12. 90 S. Ct 1029 (1970).
13. The delay was this long because the packages were mailed late in the
day and the customs office in Tennessee, where one addressee lived, could not
be reached until the next day.
14. First class mail is not subject to discretionary postal inspection. 39 CFR
§ 131.2 (1970).




Published by Scholar Commons,
CRMNAL PROCEDUIM SURVED
in question took place before the decisions in United States V.
Wade'6 and Crilbert v. California,17 which afforded an accused
the right to counsel at pretrial lineups, and that, according to
Stovall v. Denno,'8 these decisions are not to be applied retro-
actively. Thus, the court held that there was no deprivation of
any constitutional rights, since the evidence showed that the
lineup was not unnecessarily suggestive or conducive to mistaken
identification. 9
III. CONWssIoNs
In State v. Curley20 one co-defendant, Pearson, confessed to
the crime of safecracking and implicated the other co-defen-
dants as well. Curley moved for a severance on the grounds
that Pearson's confession would be admitted into evidence and
would be prejudicial to him. The motion for severance was de-
nied, and the defendant asserted that the judge's refusal to grant
the motion was error. The supreme court, in denying relief, said
that it would have been reversible error if the confession of
Pearson implicating his co-defendants had been admitted over
proper objection2l; however, this was not done, and the simple
fact that there was such a confession did not entitle Curley to a
severance of trials.
The state then proceeded to introduce against Pearson his
confession made during interrogation while in the custody of the
police. While a number of witnesses were available to testify on
the issue of waiver, only one police officer stated that the
Miranda warnings had been given and that Pearson had made
the statements freely and voluntarily. The supreme court re-
versed and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a
hearing, as required by Jackson v. Denno,2 to determine whether
the confession was voluntary and whether the procedural safe-
guards required by Miranda were satisfied. The court accu-
rately stated the applicable law in the following:
The allowance of this evidence violated his privilege
against self-incrimination unless the defendant, re-
16. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
17. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
18. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
19. If the lineup had taken place after Wade, the defendant would have
been entitled to have a hearing on whether any in-court identification was
tainted by the lawyerless lineup.
20. 253 S.C. 513, 171, S.E2d 699 (1970).
21. Id. at 519, 171 S.E2d 702, dtng Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968).
22. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
4
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ceiving the benefit of 'procedural safeguards' required
by Miranda v. Arizona . .. voluntarily and intelli-
gently waived the privilege. The burden was upon the
State to establish such waiver in an independent hearing
before a tribunal other than the trial jury, appro-
priately the trial judge. The record before us fails to
establish that this burden has been met.
23
In State v. TFhite24 the supreme court noted with approval
that the trial court had sustained an objection to the introduc-
tion of a written statement. The police officer testified that the
defendant had been advised of his rights and had waived
them. The defendant testified that he had not been given the
Miranda warnings and had not read the written statement
before signing it. The statement was labelled "voluntary state-
ment" and included in fine print an acknowledgement that the
Miranda warnings had been given. Because the evidence was
contradictory, the trial judge ruled that the written statement's
being labelled, "voluntary statement," required its exclusion,
since the issue was whether or not the statement was voluntary.
IV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Right to Effective OounseZ
The sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
and article I, § 18 of the South Carolina Constitution guarantee
the accused the right to counsel in criminal proceedings. In
recent years an increasing number of defendants have contended
that, although they have been appointed counsel, the counsel's
representation was so ineffective as to deprive them of the right
to counsel. The claims are almost always rejected,2 5 and the
general rule is that the claim will be granted only in those cases
where the counsel was so ineffective as to render the trial a
farce, a mockery, or a mere sham of justice. 2 6
In State v. Harvey2 7 the defendants claimed that their trial
counsel did not have time to prepare adequately for trial. They
were appointed only four days before trial (two of which were
Saturday and Sunday) and by their own admission were not
23. State v. Curley, 253 S.C. 513, 521, 171 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1970).
24. 253 S.C. 475, 171 S.E2d 712 (1969).
25. For a case where the representation was so inadequate that the court
held the right to counsel had effectively been denied, see Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
26. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965).
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familiar with criminal trials.28 The defendants contended that
these factors operated to deny them their right to effective
counsel. The attorneys moved for a continuance on these grounds
which the trial judge denied. The supreme court, in affirming
the trial court's denial of a continuance, stated that such matters
were properly left to the discretion of the trial judge and that
he would be overruled only for an abuse of that discretion.P
In Patterson v. StateY° the defendant raised the issue of denial
of his right to competent and effective counsel. The defendant's
family contacted counsel to represent the defendant, but at the
trial the attorney asked to be relieved because his fee had not
been paid. The judge granted his request but then designated
the attorney as court-appointed counsel. Then, as a "tactical"
maneuver the attorney stated that he did not feel that he could
adequately represent the defendant and asked for a continuance
which was granted.
On appeal the defendant contended that friction between his
attorney and himself combined with his own sense of hopeless-
ness resulted in an emotional state which prevented him from
communicating with his attorney. Thus, the defendant claimed
that he was denied his right to effective counsel. The court
found no merit in this argument, because, even if true, the de-
fendant could attribute his emotions only to his own acts8;
therefore, this asserted defense could form no grounds for relief.
The court further held that the defendant was not denied his
right to adequate counsel, for the record affirmatively showed
that counsel had done an adequate job and that he was competent
in all respects. The defendant simply did not carry his burden
of proof3 2 in asserting that his counsel was inadequate; thus,
relief was denied.
The defendant in State v. Gilehrit33 was convicted of man-
slaughter. On appeal the defendant claimed that he had been
denied adequate representation by counsel where he had been
28. Brief for Appellant at 19, State v. Harvey, 253 S.C. 328, 170 S.E.2d
657 (1969).
29. In the opinion of this writer the appellants in their brief mention a
point well worth emphasizing in cases of this nature: it is not the state, but
the accused who is entitled to a speedy trial. Brief for Appellant at 20, State
v. Harvey, 253 S.C. 328, 170 S.E.2d 657 (1969).
30. 253 S.C. 382, 171 S.E2d 235 (1969).
31. The defendant committed murder and kidnapping.
32. Petitioner must prove his assertions by a preponderance of the evidence.
Tucker v. State, 248 S.C. 344, 149 S.E2d 769 (1966).
33. 253 S.C. 23, 168 S.E.2d 779 (1969).
1970]
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represented by a retained attorney who was disbarred after the
trial for conduct not related to this case.
The defendant contended that his counsel seriously prejudiced
his case by failing to interview and have present at the trial
two eyewitnesses to the killing. This claim was supported by
affidavits from the eyewitnesses and the defendant's father in
which they alleged that the attorney had been informed of the
availability of the witnesses. The court, while recognizing that,
if the affidavits were true, they established neglect on the part
of the counsel, held that no prejudice to the defendant's case
resulted. The witnesses' testimony was merely cumulative and
would not in any way have established the defendant's claim of
self-defense.
The court further held that the record showed that counsel
ably represented the defendant and was familiar with the case.
Also, the defendant continued to employ him and expressed no
dissatisfaction with the attorney's services until he was suspended
from practice. The court stated that, in cases where private
counsel was employed, relief from a conviction would be granted
only when counsel's representation was so grossly inadequate
that the trial was a farce or a mockery of justice.
In Davies v. State84 the defendant pleaded guilty without the
benefit of counsel. The court, in rejecting the defendant's
claim of denial of his right to counsel, found that the defendant
had been given ample opportunity to retain counsel and had in-
telligently and voluntarily waived this right. At the trial court
level the defendant pleaded guilty; the trial court made an ex-
tensive inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the waiver of
counsel and the plea of guilty. The supreme court held that the
record affirmatively showed that the defendant freely, volun-
tarily, and understandingly pleaded guilty, and thus the verdict
was affirmed.
B. Right to CounseZ at Preliminary Hearing
In South Carolina the defendant, if he makes a timely demand,
has a right to have a preliminary hearing. 5 The sole purpose
of the hearing is to determine if the state has probable cause
to hold the accused. The accused is not permitted to plead or
make a sworn statement; and, if he makes an unsworn state-
ment, it cannot later be used against him. Thus, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has held that an accused has no right
34. 253 S.C. 501, 171 S.E2d 720 (1970).
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to counsel at a preliminary hearing since it is not a critical
stage.8 6
This distinction will no longer be valid in light of Coleman V.
Alaa nma. 7 In Coleman the Supreme Court held that the
Alabama preliminary hearing, which was not a required step in
the prosecution, was nevertheless a critical stage in the pro-
ceedings against the accused and that he was, therefore, entitled
to counsel at such a hearing. The Court reiterated that a critical
stage depends on "whether potential substantial prejudice to
the defendant's rights inheres in the ... confrontation and the
ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice." 8
In the view of the Colenan Court a substantial benefit to an
accused at any critical stage is counsel's ability to cross-examine
witnesses; the results of such cross-examination could serve as
a vital impeachment tool at trial or could expose the state's
case as being so weak as to result in the accused not being bound
over for trial. Also, testimony of witnesses who do not appear at
trial would be preserved, and counsel would be better able to
prepare his case. The inability of the accused to recognize and
capitalize on these advantages led the Court, therefore, to hold
that the preliminary hearing is a critical stage at which the
right to counsel attaches.
V. RIGHT or CONFR NTATiON
In Pointer v. Texas" the Supreme Court held that the right
of confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution is obligatory upon the states by the four-
teenth amendment. In Illinois v. Allen" the Court held that a
defendant whose language and behavior during his trial was so
disruptive, abusive, and disrespectful toward the judge and the
court as to make continuation of his trial impossible in his
presence was not deprived of his right to confrontation by his
removal from the courtroom.
The trial judge constantly warned the defendant that, if his
behavior did not improve, he would be removed from the court-
room. After the defendant had in fact been removed, the state
presented its case in the defendant's absence, although several
36. State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 242, 133 S.E.2d 320, 321 (1963).
37. 90 S. Ct. 1999 (1970).
38. Id. at 2002, quoting from United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227
(1967).
39. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
40. 90 S. Ct 1057 (1970).
1970]
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times the defendant was told that, upon his promise to behave,
he would be permitted to return to the trial.
The Supreme Court held that such conduct on the part of the
defendant constituted a waiver of his right to confrontation and
that the trial court committed no error in excluding the defen-
dant from the courtroom. The Court also stated that in like
cases it would be permissible to exclude the defendant from
court, tie and gag him, or sentence him for contempt.
41
VI. JURY TRIAL
In State v. Bostik 42 the South Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the refusal of the trial judge to set aside a juror who
stated that he had formed an opinion about the case on the basis
of "street talk." The court reiterated that it was in the power
of the judge to determine the competence and indifference of the
jurors and that he would be overruled on appeal only if his
conclusion was not supported by the evidence or he was influ-
enced by an error of law.
43
The trial judge made an extensive examination of the juror
in question, who stated that he would give the state and the
accused a fair and impartial trial and would base his verdict
solely on the evidence presented in court.
If a juror states that he has formed an opinion but that
it is not so fixed that it cannot be changed by testimony,
and that he is not biased, and can give the defendant a
fair trial, the judge may properly refuse to grant a
challenge for cause. 44
In State v. Atkinson45 the defendant was on trial for murder.
During the jury's deliberation they returned to the courtroom
and inquired if the defendant were given life imprisonment,
would he ever become eligible for parole. In response to this
question the trial judge admonished the jury that, when a man
41. The Supreme Court recognized that excluding the defendant from the
courtroom was perhaps the best way to deal with an unruly defendant. Tying
and gagging, aside from being repugnant to look at, may arouse undue
sympathy from the jury. Also, a man faced with death or life imprisonment
may well prefer to serve a series of contempt sentences for unruliness in
hopes that prosecution witnesses may die or the facts become so clouded with
age as to render a conviction impossible.
42. 253 S.C. 205, 169 S.E2d 608 (1969).
43. State v. Johnson, 248 S.C. 153, 149 S.E.2d 348 (1966).
44. W. LEDi3rrun & W. MYERS, CmnaINA. DEFENSE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
124 (1970).
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does become eligible for parole, the determination of whether he
would be paroled or not was left to the Parole Board and the
fact of whether he would be paroled or not was not a matter for
the jury's consideration. Shortly thereafter, the jury returned
a verdict of guilty of murder without a recommendation of
mercy, which resulted in the defendant being given the death
penalty.
The defendant contended that this exchange between the
judge and the jury seriously prejudiced his rights in that the
jury sentenced him to death because of the possibility of parole.
The court stated that the prevailing view in this country is that
the jury, in fixing the penalty, should not be invited by instruc-
tion or argument to speculate on the possible effect of pardon
or parole on the sentence imposed.48 Although affirming the
conviction, the court stated that in the future perhaps greater
specificity should be used. The court upheld the judge's in-
structions, since the jury was told that parole was none of their
concern.4
7
The defendant in State v. Atkinson4s also alleged error on the
grounds that three jurors were excused who stated that they were
unequivocally opposed to capital punishment and could not con-
sent to any verdict which would result in the death penalty. The
court in accord with Witherspoon v. IZlinois49 held that it was
not error to exclude those jurors who were so opposed to capital
46. Id. at 534, 172 S.E2d at 112, citing, Annot., 12 A.L.R. 3d 832, 834 (1967).
47. In the opinion of this writer the prejudice to the defendant was so
strong that it required a new trial. The jury in its question to the judge,
"if the defendant becomes eligible for parole," (253 S.C. at 534, 172 S.E.2d
at 112), was obviously not concerned with the function of the parole board
or its members but merely whether there was any chance that this man would
be put back on the streets in the event of a sentence of life imprisonment.
Then, taking as valid the general rule that the jury should not consider the
effect of parole on its sentence, this writer would draw the conclusion that in
fact the jury did consider the possibility of parole. The judge in his answer
to the jury's question spoke of "when a man becomes eligible for parole,"
(253 S.C. at 534, 172 S.E2d at 112), leaving the inference that the defendant
might become eligible for parole. There is, of course, no way to determine
how the jury reacted to this statement, but the court stated that shortly
thereafter the jury returned with the death penalty. So, there is a strong
inference, too strong when a man's life is at stake, that the jury assumed
that the defendant might become eligible for parole. The court itself suggested
an instruction recommended in State v. Conner, 241 N.C. 468, 471-72, 85
S.E.2d 584, 587 (1955) which said, in substance, that parole is not a matter
for the jury's concern and that they should decide on death or life imprisonment
on the basis of the facts presented and not on what any other branch of the
government might do at a later date.
48. 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970).
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punishment that they could not assent to a verdict which would
result in the death penalty, regardless of what the evidence
dictated.
In Ladd v. South Carolina the state appealed from an order
of the federal district court granting the defendant a writ of
habeas corpus. Two of the veniremen had been contacted in
Ladd's favor before the trial began, and one of the contacted
men served on the jury which convicted Ladd. The venireman
who was contacted but did not serve made the contact known
to the judge, who then, out of the jury's presence, conducted a
hearing and decided that the contact was not prejudicial. In
his instructions to the jury the judge admonished the jury not
to consider anything heard out of court and commented that in
his opinion anyone who attempted to influence a juror committed
one of the most dastardly acts which a, man could do.
The district court, in granting the writ, was influenced by
Remmer 'v. United States51 where the Court held that any im-
proper private communication to a juror was presumptively
prejudicial and that the state must carry a strong burden of
proof in disproving prejudice.
In overruling the district court's decision, the court of appeals
held that the state had proved that no prejudice did result. In
Remmer the court, after learning of the improper contact, had an
agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation make an investi-
gation and said nothing to the defense about the matter. The
court in Remmer felt that the juror may have been unduly
discomfited by the investigation and that this may have in-
fluenced his decision.
In Ladd this was not possible because the juror did not know
that the contact was known ta the court and he could not have
taken the charge personally. The court of appeals felt that the
state had disproved any possible prejudice to the defendant and
thus denied his writ of habeas corpus. Remmer only dictated
that the judge determine in a hearing whether the contact was
prejudicial, and this requirement was met in the present case.
In Baldwin v. New York7 5 2 the defendant was convicted of
"jostling"58 without a jury trial and sentenced to one year in
50. 415 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1969).
51. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
52. 90 S. Ct. 1886 (1970).
53. "Jostling" is a crime contrived by legislatures to control pickpockets.
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jail. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that,
when the possible punishment for a crime exceeds six months,
the crime cannot be considered petty for purposes of determining
whether or not the defendant is entitled to a jury trial.
The Court rejected the felony-misdemeanor distinction as de-
terminative of the right to a jury trial and based it instead on
the possible punishment which the defendant can receive. Now,
in all cases where the maximum possible punishment exceeds six
months, the defendant has a right to trial by jury.
The question of whether the right to trial by jury means a
twelve man jury was presented to the Supreme Court in Williams
v. Florida.4 The Court came to the conclusion that a twelve man
jury was but a historical accident and holds no constitutional
significance.
While expressing the view that twelve men may be an ideal
size for a jury -large enough to promote deliberation, and yet
small enough to retain the individual sense of responsibility -
the Court held that there was no constitutional prohibition on a
jury of a different size. The Court stated that it would leave the
size of juries to the legislatures unhampered by any constitu-
tional requirements.
VII. SPEEDY TRmL
In Dickey v. Floida"5 the defendant was tried and convicted
for an armed robbery which allegedly occurred eight years prior
to his trial. Numerous motions for a prompt trial had been filed
by the defendant, who, although he was incarcerated in a fed-
eral prison the entire eight years, could still have been made
available for trial. The Supreme Court held that the unex-
plained and unnecessary delay violated the defendant's right to
a speedy trial; and where two potential witnesses had died,
another was unavailable, and police records had been destroyed,
the conviction was reversed and the state barred from bringing
any other proceeding arising out of the charges.
VIII. Gurnr PLEAS
With today's overcrowded criminal dockets, the guilty plea
is necessary to the effective administration of the criminal
courts. Yet in the period surveyed, more cases involved attacks
54. 90 S. Ct. 1893 (1970).
55. 90 S. Ct. 1564 (1970).
1970]
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on guilty pleas obtained through the plea-bargaining system
than any other single question on appeal.
In MeMann v. Richardson" the Court considered the ques-
tion of whether an improperly obtained confession renders a
subsequent guilty plea invalid. This question quite often
arises when the defendant has confessed to the crime and
there is a possibility that the confession will be deemed free
and voluntary and introduced into evidence against him. The
defendant can either plead guilty and usually get a lighter
sentence, or he can go to trial and attempt to have the con-
fession ruled inadmissible; in the later instance he will either
win his case or, if the confession is admitted, be found guilty
and possibly receive a stiffer penalty.57 If the defendant
attempts to have the confession ruled inadmissible, and it is
admitted over objection, he can later attack the admission on
appeal.
The Court held that, in these circumstances with reasonably
competent advice of counsel, the defendant must either plead
guilty or attack the confession at trial. He cannot plead
guilty and then later in a collateral proceeding attack the
plea as involuntary because of a confession which he thinks
is inadmissible.
The Court summed up its position in the following state-
ment:
In our view a defendants plea of guilty based on
reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not
open to attack on the grounds that counsel may
have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant's
confession.58
In State v. Fuller59 the South Carolina Supreme Court was
faced with the same question presented in MMann'V. Richard-
son. The defendant, after an extensive examination by the
trial court, intelligently and voluntarily pleaded guilty to
murder. On appeal he attacked his guilty plea as being
induced by an involuntary confession. The court held that,
56. 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970).
57. This necessarily assumes that the state's case without the confession is
too weak to convict the defendant.
58. McMann v. Richardson, 90 S. Ct 1441, 1448 (1970). The Court also
stated that waiving trial entails the risk that good-faith judgments of reasonably
competent counsel will turn out to be mistaken. Id.
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in pleading guilty, the defendant had waived his right to
attack his confession as involuntary later. The court stated
the general rule that a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a
waiver of nonjurisdictional defenses, including any violations
of constitutional rights prior to the plea.60
In Brady v. United States6" the defendant was essentially
attacking the plea bargaining system. The defendant was
indicted for kidnapping and, if he went to trial, faced a
possible death sentence; instead he pleaded guilty and re-
ceived a sentence of thirty years. On appeal he claimed that
his guilty plea was invalid because it is a violation of the
fifth amendment to influence or encourage a guilty plea by
a promise of leniency and that he was coerced by the fear
of a greater penalty if the state was forced to prove its case.
The Court held that a guilty plea is not coerced, and hence
invalid, if motivated by the defendant's desire to plead guilty
and accept the probability of a lesser punishment rather than
go to trial and chance receiving a penalty ranging from
acquittal to the highest penalty authorized by law.
In Brady the defendant also claimed that he had pleaded
guilty because of fear of the death penalty which was au-
thorized by law. Subsequent to Brady's plea, the Supreme
Court held in United States v. Jackso702 that the death
penalty could not be imposed under the statute 3  under
which Brady was sentenced because it needlessly discouraged
the assertion of a person's innocence. But the court stated that
this does not necessarily imply that a person who pleads guilty
under the statute did so involuntarily. The test is still whether
the guilty plea was intelligently and voluntarily made.
Sanders v. Leeke 64 presented a similar question to the South
Carolina Supreme Court. In that case the defendant charged
with murder was allowed, after the consent of the solicitor
was obtained, to plead guilty to the lesser included offense of
manslaughter and thereby to avoid a possible death sentence.
On appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus, the
court held that the evidence fully established that the de-
fendant had pleaded guilty intelligently and voluntarily.
60. Id. at 35, citing 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 424(7) (1961). For an
exception to the general rule, see Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
61. 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970).
62. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
63. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (1966).
64. Smith's Adv. Sht., No. 24, Op. No. 19081 (S.C. July 18, 1970).
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Therefore, in accord with Brady, the mere fact that he did so
to avoid the possible imposition of the death penalty did not
render his plea involuntary. The court quoted Brady as say-
ing that it is not unconstitutional for the state to give a man
a substantial benefit for pleading guilty since the defendant
in so doing also yields a substantial benefit to the state. The
court further stated that the fact that Sanders was reluctant
to plead guilty was of no consequence since the record showed
that he did so voluntarily.
In Breland v. State65 the defendant pleaded guilty to a
charge of rape, and the trial judge accepted his plea under
section 17-553.4 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina of
1962 and gave him a sentence of twenty-one years. Under
section 17-553.4 of the Code the trial judge is allowed to ac-
cept a plea of guilty to a capital offense in lieu of a jury
recommendation of mercy. Therefore, by pleading guilty, the
defendant can avoid the death penalty. Subsequent to Bre-
land's plea of guilty, in State v. Harper60 the court ruled
this section unconstitutional as unduly encouraging the de-
fendant to plead guilty.
The court in accord with Brady held that the statute did
not necessarily cause every guilty plea that was entered under
it to be coerced, but that it was the duty of the court to de-
termine, in light of the effect of the statute, if the plea was or
was not freely, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The court
determined from the record that Breland pleaded guilty on
advice of counsel and that, although he was reluctant, it was
still voluntary. Breland stated at his habeas corpus hearing
that the only reason he pleaded guilty was because he antici-
pated a much lighter sentence than the one which he received.
IX. SnENMCING
In Williams V. Ilino1so7 the defendant was sentenced to
one year's imprisonment and fined five-hundred dollars, the
statutory maximum for petty theft. The defendant was also
taxed five dollars for court costs. The sentence provided that,
if at the end of the one year prison sentence the defendant
65. 253 S.C. 187, 169 S.E2d 604 (1969).
66. 251 S.C. 379, 162 S.E.2d 712 (1968). The court ruled this statute uncon-
stitutional because of the mandate of United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968).
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could not pay the fine, he was to be held in confinement until
he worked off the fine at the rate of five dollars per day.
The defendant was indigent and could not pay the fine. The
result was that the sentence caused the indigent defendant
to be confined beyond the maximum period provided by
statute because he could not pay the fine.
The Supreme Court held that, when the aggregate period
of punishment for a crime exceeds the statutory maximum
and this is the direct result of an involuntary nonpayment
of a fine or court costs, there is unreasonable and unequal
discrimination based solely on ability to pay; therefore, the
Court reversed. The Court stated the policy reason for the
decision by saying that there is no "equal justice where the
kind of a trial (sentence) a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has."68 This prolonged sentence would fall only
on the indigent, and in the Court's view such a result was not
permissible. This holding was carefully restricted to the facts
by the Court, and the opinion also stated that this decision did
not deal in any way with the thirty dollars or thirty days
type of sentence.
South Carolina law and practice will be affected in those
cases with fact situations similar to that in Williams. Section
17-574 of the 1962 Code provides that indigents may be con-
fined to jail until their fines have been satisfied. So in those
cases where the defendant is sentenced to the statutory maxi-
mum plus a fine, Williams will dictate that he caunot be held
in confinement to pay off the fine beyond the statutory limit.
X. APPEALs
In State v. Awderson69 the defendant was convicted of mur-
der and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal the de-
fendant attempted to raise several points which were not
raised in the trial court. In a capital case it is well settled
in this state that the supreme court will take notice of any
error which affects the substantial rights of the accused even
though the same was not made a ground of appeal70
In Anderson, however, the court restricted this doctrine to
only those cases where the defendant received the death pen-
alty. The fact that he could have been sentenced to death is
68. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
69. 253 S.C. 168, 169 S.E.2d 706 (1969).
70. State v. Bigham, 133 S.C. 491, 508, 131 S.E2d 603, 608 (1926).
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of no importance. The court henceforth will apply this doc-
trine only in those instances where the defendant actually
received the death penalty.
In Alfinito v. United States71 the defendant sought to
obtain a copy of the minutes of the criminal proceedings
against him. The district court, in denying his request, held
that, absent any showing of need, charging of error, or depri-
vation of constitutional rights, the transcript need not be
furnished. The state at its expense need not provide a copy
of the documents for the defendant to peruse so that he can
decide if he wishes to engage in any further -litigation absent
some assertion of error.
XI. DounuL JEoPADy
In Benton v. Maryland 72 the Supreme Court held that the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment was applica-
ble to the states through the fourteenth amendment. In the
survey period the Supreme Court decided three cases of great
interest and importance in this area.
In Waller v. Flor&a78 the Court considered whether a de-
fendant could be tried for the same, or an included, offense
in both the municipal and the state courts. The defendant
was tried in a municipal court for destruction of city prop-
erty and later in state court for grand larceny. The state
courts considered the ordinance violation as included in grand
larceny, and the Supreme Court decided the case on that
supposition.
The decision was primarily based on the fact that the de-
fendant had been tried and convicted twice by two courts of
the same sovereignty. This result followed from the fact that
the municipal courts were created by and derived their powers
from the state government. The Court thus held that the
second trial for the same crime was violative of the defen-
dant's right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense; the second conviction was, therefore, a nullity. This
decision will not affect state and federal prosecutions for the
same acts, since they are two distinct sovereignties and their
judicial powers are derived from separate sources.
71. 305 F. Supp. 568 (D.S.C. 1969).
72. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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The Court in Ashe V: S'wenson7 4 held that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is embodied in the double jeopardy clause
of the fifth amendment. The defendant, along with two or
three accomplices, was charged with robbing six men who
were playing poker. The defendant was first tried for robbing
one of the players. At the trial the state's evidence that the
defendant was one of the robbers was weak, and he was
acquitted by the jury for insufficient evidence. Six weeks
later, the state again tried the defendant for robbing one of
the other poker players. At this trial the state's evidence,
from the same witnesses, was much stronger as to the defen-
dant's identity, and he was convicted. It seems as if the six
weeks delay had improved the witnesses's memory.
In overruling the second conviction, the Supreme Court
defined "collateral estoppel" as standing for the proposition
that, once an issue of ultimate fact has been decided by a
valid and final judgment, it cannot be relitigated between the
same parties. This rule was first one of civil law, but it has
been for fifty years a rule of federal criminal law. 5
This rule was incorporated into the double jeopardy pro-
vision by the Court. In Ashe its effect was this: at the first
trial the only issue to be determined was the identity of the
defendant. Once the jury decided that he was not one of the
robbers, the state was estopped from trying to prove that he
was in a later trial. Therefore, any subsequent trial of Ashe
for the robbery of the other men was barred.
This rule has one important qualification. Where the de-
fendant is first acquitted on a general verdict of not guilty and
is later retried and convicted, the appellate court must look at
the entire record and determine if the jury could have con-
victed on any issue other than the one which the defendant
wishes to preclude from consideration. Therefore, the court,
in making the rule of collateral estoppel applicable to the
states, will preclude the state from trying a defendant several
times to obtain a conviction under similar factual circum-
stances.
In Price v. Georgia76 the defendant was tried for murder
and convicted on the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter. The conviction was overturned on appeal. The
74. 90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970).
75. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
76. 90 S. Ct 1757 (1970).
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defendant was again tried for murder and again convicted
of voluntary manslaughter. The Court, in reversing the con-
viction, held that the state was limited to trying the de-
fendant for voluntary manslaughter in the second trial. The
Court reasoned that, since in the first case the jury was given
a chance to convict the defendant of murder and had instead
convicted him of the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter, he had impliedly been acquitted of murder;
this implied acquittal ended his susceptibility to jeopardy.
The fact that the defendant was not convicted of murder the
second time was deemed to be of no importance. The double
jeopardy clause talks in terms of being put in jeopardy,
not in terms of conviction. Thus, jeopardy ended for Price
with the implied acquittal for murder, and he could not again
be tried for murder.
77
XII. JUVENI COURTS
The Court in In Re Gault7 held that a juvenile trial re-
quires the essentials of due process and fair treatment. In
the case of In Re Winship79 the United States Supreme Court
was faced with the issue of whether or not a juvenile could
be declared delinquent on a standard of proof less than the
standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court first stated that "[t]he Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged." 0 The Court then held that
the reasonable doubt standard is required in the adjudicatorys
stage of a delinquency hearing by the due process clause. The
Court rejected the argument that, because a juvenile hearing
is sometimes labelled civil rather than criminal, the Court
should hold the due process clause inapplicable to juvenile
proceedings.
RAYmOND DAVID MASSEY
77. The Court did not express any opinion as to whether the defendant
could be retried for voluntary manslaughter but left that decision to the
Georgia courts.
78. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
79. 9(0 S. Ct. 1068 (1970).
80. Id. at 1073.
81. In most states, juvenile hearings are bifurcated: the adjudicatory phase
is determinative as to guilt or innocence, and the disposition hearing is determi-
native as to what is to be done with the juvenile. See also Comment, Infant's
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